Quantifying the efficiency of the Xetra LOB market: a detailed recipe by Sperl, Miriam
 
 
 
 
No. 2008/21 
Quantifying the Efficiency of the Xetra LOB Market 
A Detailed Recipe 
 
Miriam Sperl 
 
 
  
 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected 
topics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants 
in the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research 
Projects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. 
  
*  Miriam Sperl is PhD student at the Eberhard-Karls-University in Tübingen. She would like to thank Professor Dr. Joachim Grammig who 
has shown a large and consistent interest in her studies and her academic qualification ever since her appointment as student assistant at 
his chair. She further gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Center for Financial Studies of the Johann- Wolfgang-Goethe 
University in Frankfurt (Main). 
 
1  University of Tübingen, Address: Eberhard-Karls-University in Tübingen, Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Empirical 
Economics, Mohlstrasse 36, D-72074 Tübingen, Germany, Phone: +49 7071 29 72945, Fax: +49 7071 29 5546,                                  
Email: miriam.sperl@uni-tuebingen.de. 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2008/21 
 
Quantifying the Efficiency of the Xetra LOB Market 
A Detailed Recipe* 
 
 
Miriam Sperl
1 
 
 
 
7 May 2008 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Motivated by the prominent role of electronic limit order book (LOB) markets in today’s 
stock market environment, this paper provides the basis for understanding, reconstructing and 
adopting Hollifield, Miller, Sandas, and Slive’s (2006) (henceforth HMSS) methodology for 
estimating the gains from trade to the Xetra LOB market at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(FSE) in order to evaluate its performance in this respect. Therefore this paper looks deeply 
into HMSS’s base model and provides a structured recipe for the planned implementation 
with Xetra LOB data. The contribution of this paper lies in the modification of HMSS’s 
methodology with respect to the particularities of the Xetra trading system that are not yet 
considered in HMSS’s base model. The necessary modifications, as expressed in terms of 
empirical caveats, are substantial to derive unbiased market efficiency measures for Xetra in 
the end. 
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The enormous progress in computer and telecommunication technologies accompanied
by the dramatic decline in their development costs as observed over the last few decades
have promoted and still keep on promoting the diffusion of electronic open limit order
book (LOB) markets across the world. By the end of the nineties Domowitz and Steil
(1999) not only observe that many emerging markets apply the LOB design right from
the very beginning but their analysis also reveals that a signiﬁcant number of already
existing markets undergo restructuring away from traditional trading ﬂoors to pure or-
der driven or hybrid trading systems.1 To underline this development, they report that
in the exemplary time span from 1997 to 1998 a considerable number of sixteen stock
exchanges, including as prominent examples London, Tokyo and Toronto, conduct such
a transformation. A recent study provided by Jain (2003) shows that nowadays the over-
whelming majority of over 80% of the world’s exchanges with a market capitalization
of equal dimension operate some sort of electronic trading mechanism with automatic
execution.2
Unlike traditional exchange mechanisms open LOB markets operate without the in-
termediation of dealers, who participate in every trade in quote driven markets, or bro-
kers, who are responsible for ﬁnding liquidity in brokered markets. Instead LOB mar-
kets use rule-based order matching systems that are implemented electronically and in
which liquidity supply and demand are provided by traders themselves instead of deal-
ers or brokers: patient traders offer liquidity by indicating the conditions under which
they will trade via the submission of instructions to buy (sell) a given number of shares
at the best price possible but not to pay (demand) more (less) than a limit price (limit
order traders). Impatient traders directly demand liquidity by accepting the limit order
traders’ conditions via the submission of market orders that trade a given number of
shares at the best price available (market order traders). The limit orders are queued
1Hybrid trading systems obey characteristics of quote driven, brokered and order driven markets. The
currently most prominent example of a hybrid market is the New York Stock Exchange.
2More precisely 51% of the world’s exchanges operate as pure LOB markets with a share of market
capitalization of 28% while the other 29% of the world’s exchanges are attributable to hybrid markets
with a share of market capitalization of 50%.
1into the electronic LOB according to order precedence rules while well deﬁned pric-
ing rules ascertain their automatic execution. In open LOB markets the electronic order
book is displayed to all market participants.
Given the prominent role of the LOB market design in today’s stock market environ-
ment, an important question is how efﬁcient LOB markets actually operate and whether
particular LOB markets perform better than others. For such a performance evaluation
it is essential to obtain a profound knowledge of the determinants of liquidity and price
formation in LOB markets. The analysis of the latter in turn requires a deep understan-
ding of the fundamental decision problem that traders face in LOB markets involving
not only the order type choice (choice between buy versus sell order and market versus
limit order) but also the timing of the order submission.
A vast literature developed around these subjects. Two classes of theoretical LOB
models derive equilibrium prices in LOB markets and exploit how price setting rules
evolve and determine traders’ optimal order placement strategies: the class of static and
the class of dynamic LOB models. The former are static in the sense that equilibrium
conditions in LOB markets are determined at a speciﬁc point in time considering only
past and current information. In contrast, the equilibrium conditions in dynamic LOB
models are determined over time, i.e. not only by taking into account current and past
information, but also by allowing for the anticipation of future events. The roots of these
model classes go back to three seminal papers: the work of Glosten (1994) who intro-
duced the class of static LOB models and the models of Parlour (1998) and Foucault
(1999) who particularly inﬂuenced the class of dynamic LOB models. The theoretical
LOB models reveal as driving forces of the price formation and the liquidity provision in
LOB markets the optimal order placement strategies of traders that result from ﬁnding
trade-offs between execution probabilities, picking off risks and order prices for alterna-
tive order submissions. Order book information turns out to considerably help traders
to solve this fundamental decision problem.
On the basis of the predictions provided by the theoretical LOB models a variety of
descriptive and econometric analyses evolved that deal with econometric modeling and
2hypothesis testing: Sand˚ as (2001) and Frey and Grammig (2006) present econometric
methodologies for testing economic restrictions on the price schedules offered in pure
open LOB markets. Their approaches directly build on Glosten’s (1994) baseline model
and incorporate real world LOB market features like discrete prices and time priority
rules. While Sand˚ as’s (2001) approach contains too many simplifying assumptions ren-
dering impossible to ﬁt the data well, Frey and Grammig’s (2006) variant succeeds to
provide evidence for Glosten’s (1994) model putting forward one of the key messages
of LOB market theory, namely that liquidity supply and adverse selection costs are in-
versely related.
In common with Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) who analyze the interaction between
the order book and the order ﬂow using a sample from the LOB market at the Paris
Bourse by means of rather basic statistical tools, a variety of descriptive and experimen-
tal studies use the rich information ﬂow delivered by electronic LOB markets to test
predictions of dynamic LOB market theory and to reveal further stylized facts (Degryse,
de Jong, Ravenswaaij, and Wuyts (2005), Coppejans, Domowitz, and Madhavan (2004),
Gomber, Schweickert, and Theissen (2004) and Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2006)). Besides
the assessment of the informational content of the order book in determining a security’s
true value, the main focus of these studies lies on the analysis of aggressive orders and
the resiliency of LOB markets. The aggressiveness of an order is measured in terms of
the price and time priority demanded by traders; the higher the demand for price and
time priority of a trader the more aggressive his order. The resiliency of a market refers
to the rate at which prices revert to former levels after having been changed in response
to large order ﬂow imbalances induced by aggressive orders (cp. Harris (2003)) and is
used to evaluate an LOB market’s performance in this respect.
WhilethestudiesinlinewithBiais, Hillion, andSpatt(1995)weremainlydescriptive,
Grifﬁths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000), Ranaldo (2004) and Pascual and Veredas
(2006) implement the classiﬁcation of orders according to their aggressiveness by means
of ordered probit techniques with explanatory variables that capture the state of the
order book. Bisi` ere and Kamionka (2000), Hall and Hautsch (2006) and Large (2007) ar-
3gue in favor of using multivariate point processes (duration or intensity based models)
that allow to model market orders, limit orders and cancelations as individual but in-
terdependent processes while simultaneously accounting for order book dynamics. The
previous literature of econometric LOB models provides evidence for the intertwined
dynamics between the order book and the order ﬂow in real world LOB markets. It
further points out the signiﬁcant informational content of the LOB with regard to the
underlying value of assets. Moreover, the literature presents means for the performance
evaluation of real world LOB markets on the basis of the various dimensions of liquidity
putting forward results that conﬁrm the quality of this market design.
Instead of measuring a market’s quality in terms of its resiliency, which is only one
dimension of liquidity, the calculation of the gains agents derive from trading provides
another way to assess a market’s quality. Economists measure the gains agents derive
from trading by the surpluses they obtain as a consequence of a transaction. A seller’s
surplus is generally deﬁned as the difference between the trade price and his valuation
of the stock, a buyer’s surplus as the difference between his valuation of the stock and
thetrade price, with bothsurpluseseventually beingreducedbytransaction costs. What
makes it challenging to measure the gains from trade by trader surpluses is that, in
general, the valuation a trader places on the stock he trades is unknown.
Holliﬁeld, Miller, Sand˚ as, and Slive (2006) (henceforth HMSS) provide an econo-
metric methodology that links traders’ optimal order submissions in LOB markets with
traders’valuationsforthestockandthetrade-offsacrossexecutionprobabilities, picking
off risks and order prices for alternative order submissions compare Holliﬁeld, Miller,
and Sand˚ as (2004). These relations make possible to determine traders’ surpluses and to
actually compute estimates of the gains from trade. The main end-product of HMSS’s
approach are such estimates derived for an order driven stock exchange that are com-
puted as a percentage of the theoretical benchmarks of maximum possible or monopoly-
induced gains from trade - results that serve as standardized and hence comparable
measures to assess the efﬁciency of real world LOB markets. HMSS’s methodology pro-
vides convincing results for the estimates of the gains from trade for the LOB market at
4the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE) - a fact that encourages to adopt their method to
other real world LOB markets for the purpose of market performance evaluation and
comparison.3 The objective of this paper is to look deeply into HMSS’s methodology for
estimating the gains from trade in LOB markets in order to provide a detailed recipe for
the planned application of this method to the Xetra LOB system at the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange (FSE).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explicitly describes
the market structure of the Xetra trading system at the FSE which provides useful for
the adoption of HMSS’s methodology to the German stock market as it reveals potential
features of the Xetra LOB market that need to be factored into the HMSS base model.
The econometric methodology for quantifying the efﬁciency of the Xetra LOB market
in terms of the gains from trade is presented in section 3. Section 4 provides a detailed
recipe for the econometric implementation and the ﬁnal computation of HMSS’s market
efﬁciency measures. Section 5 deals with empirical caveats and extensions. Section 6
ﬁnally concludes.
2 Market Structure of the Xetra LOB Market
Trading takes place during the trading session that can be speciﬁed further by its trading
forum, its trading hours and by the type of trading session that is used to arrange trades.
Concerning the trading forum, the Xetra trading system is a so-called distributed access
market: due to client-server solutions traders in different locations have worldwide ac-
cess to this system via their trading screens. With respect to the trading hours, regular
trading on Xetra takes place during the normal business hours from 9:00 a.m. CET to
5:30 p.m. CET on trading days of the FSE. During the pretrading phase starting at 7:30
a.m. CET market participants are allowed to cancel and change old or submit new or-
ders and quotes to prepare for the main trading phase. The hours after the closing of
the main trading phase until 8:30 p.m. CET are used to adjust existing positions and to
3HMSS ﬁnd that for the LOB market at the VSE the current gains from trade are approximately 90% of
the maximum gains from trade and approximately 50% more than the monopoly gains from trade.
5submit new orders that will be incorporated in the next day’s regular trading session.
Moreover, traders use these posttrading hours to work on their trades with regard to
the settlement and the reporting of the results to potential clients. Regarding the type
of trading session that is used to arrange trades, Xetra can behave as both a continuous
market and a call market depending on the security that needs to be traded. While only
a negligible fraction of securities4 is traded in a call auction once a day or in continuous
auctions throughout the day, for the majority of securities, such as the stocks of the DAX
30 for example, Xetra is generally referred to as a continuous market in which trading
is possible anytime the market is open. Nevertheless, the regular continuous trading
session on Xetra is enriched by call market elements since it begins with an opening call
auction, ends with a closing call auction and is interrupted by a mid-day call auction.
Besides, call auctions can be used to restart continuous trading after trading halts.
The execution system of a market constitutes the core of the market structure as it
deﬁnes how buyers are matched to sellers and how trade prices are determined. The
three main types of execution systems are the quote driven market, the brokered market
and the order driven market. The electronic trading system Xetra is a typical example
of the latter containing traces of a quote driven market for smaller listed stocks.5 In or-
der to do without the intermediation of dealers, who participate in every trade in the
quote driven market, or brokers, who are responsible for ﬁnding liquidity in the bro-
kered market, Xetra uses a rule-based order-matching system. This system ascertains a
smooth functioning of the trading procedure via a set of well deﬁned trading rules that
are implemented electronically and work without further intermediation under normal
circumstances: the order precedence rules that match buyers to sellers and the pric-
ing rules that deﬁne which price has to be paid for a particular trade. In order to take
part in the trading process, traders make their trading conditions available to the Xe-
tra system in electronic form. As a result, liquidity supply and demand are provided
4Namely ’other shares’ and ’Covered Warrants, Certiﬁcates, Reverse Convertibles’; see
the Xetra R ° trading parameters available on the Deutsche B¨ orse webpage (http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/kir/gdb navigation/trading members/12 Xetra/45 Trading Parameter).
5If a stock does not comply with the liquidity requirements for continuous trading, it needs to be su-
pervised by a so-called designated sponsor. The banks or securities trading houses, who act as designated
sponsors, guarantee price quality by providing additional liquidity.
6by traders themselves as limit order traders offer liquidity by indicating the conditions
under which they will trade and market order traders directly demand liquidity by ac-
cepting the limit order traders’ conditions. Nevertheless, trading on Xetra is not directly
allowed to any individual who wants to trade but is rather delimited to ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and securities trading houses that are simply referred to as traders from now on.
Individuals can only trade indirectly through these channels.
Xetra’s primary order precedence rule is price priority meaning that the trader, who
is willing to buy at the highest price among all buyers and the trader, who is willing to
sell at the lowest price among all sellers, are matched ﬁrst. If the primary order prece-
dence rule is insufﬁcient to unambiguously rank all buyers and sellers, the secondary
order precedence rule ﬁnds a remedy which is time priority for Xetra: for two orders
being identically ranked along the price dimension, an order will be considered ﬁrst if it
has been submitted ﬁrst. In the presence of special order types like iceberg orders time
priority can be dominated by the display precedence rule that gives the visible fraction
of the order precedence over its hidden counterpart.6 The interplay of Xetra’s order
precedence rules encourages traders to permanently improve the best prices and to be
honest concerning the display of their orders which are features that are very beneﬁcial
for traders who wish to execute immediately.
Once an unambiguous hierarchy of buy and sell orders is assessed with the help of
order precedence rules and once all this information is stored in the electronic order
book, sellers are matched with buyers along this hierarchy. Trades occur whenever the
sellside overlaps the buyside in the sense that sellers meet buyers that accept the re-
spective trade conditions concerning the price and the volume of the asset of interest.
In continuous markets the best bid and the best offer do not overlap but trades rather
occur immediately whenever incoming orders can be ﬁlled with already existing orders
stored in the order book. Orders that can be ﬁlled immediately are called marketable
orders, in contrast to non-marketable orders that enter the order book and still have to
wait for being executed.
6In the case of iceberg orders (also called hidden orders) only a fraction of the order quantity is dis-
played to the market.
7After matching buyers with sellers, trade prices need to be determined. The determi-
nation of trade prices on Xetra follows two different rules. As Xetra is both a continuous
market as well as a call market depending on the security that needs to be traded, this
feature is reﬂected in its execution system, too: when behaving as a continuous market,
Xetra conducts continuous two-sided auctions and the price discovery process follows
the so-called discriminatory pricing rule; when behaving as a call market, single-price
auctions are required for the price discovery process alongside the so-called uniform
pricing rule. Under the discriminatory pricing rule, it is the limit price of the standing
order that determines the price for each trade, whereas under the uniform pricing rule
all trades take place at the same market clearing price being the price that maximizes
traded volume.7
Concerning the market information system, the existence of an electronic order book
on Xetra ensures that all information related to orders is stored with the maximum pos-
sible accuracy: a market order is stored with its date, time and volume at entry and its
date, time, volume and price at execution; a limit order is stored with its date, time,
volume and limit price at entry and its time at (partial) execution or cancelation; and so
on. Hence, Xetra’s electronic order book is more than simply an information collection
system, but it is an extremely valuable source of information as it reveals the conditions
under which trades occur. During continuous trading Xetra behaves as an open LOB
market in the sense that its order book is displayed to all market participants. Open
LOB markets offer the highest degree of transparency as they do not only report quotes
and orders immediately, which is referred to as offering ex ante transparency, but also
report trades without any delay, which is referred to as offering ex post transparency.
Xetra is less transparent during single price auctions where the order book is partially
closed. The amount of information announced during single price auctions varies dy-
namically depending on the market situation: while in the case of a crossed order book
the hypothetical price resulting under the uniform pricing rule is published, in the case
7For a more detailed description and exemplary illustration see Marktmodell Ak-
tien, Xetra R ° Release 7.1, available at the webpage of Deutsche B¨ orse (http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/kir/gdb navigation/trading members/12 Xetra/35 Market Model).
8of non-overlapping buy and sell sides the best bid and ask quotes are announced, both
indications eventually enriched by information about market imbalances.8 Neverthe-
less, traders do not favor the highest degree of transparency in all respects: although
they wish to see all information available about the behavior of other traders, they usu-
ally prefer to act in secrecy in order to maintain potential informational advantages.
Xetra handles this fact as follows: it provides ex ante anonymity for all instruments,
but ex post anonymity only where Xetra has a central counterparty service (CCP). For
various instruments such as those of the DAX for example, the CCP arbitrates between
sellers and buyers and does not only ensure anonymity, but also takes the potential risk
of default.
3 MethodologyforQuantifyingtheEfﬁciencyoftheXetra
LOB Market
3.1 Theoretical Model
The basic setup of the model can be summarized as follows: the execution system un-
derlying HMSS’s analysis is a continuous order driven market for a single risky asset.
The asset’s underlying value yt is a random variable with innovations drawn from a sta-
tionary process with possibly time-varying conditional moments. The market dispenses
with designated market makers and works on the basis of an electronic open LOB with
a potential multiple-tick spread between the best quotes at the best ask price p
buy
t,0 and
the best bid price psell
t,0 . The trading process is regulated by strict price and time priority
as order precedence rules. The determination of trade prices follows the discriminatory
pricing rule. The market is further characterized as a one-shot, one-unit market.9 Orders
may last for multiple periods and can be canceled but are not permitted to be modiﬁed.
The submission of an order requires the payment of an order submission fee c0 ¸ 0,
8For further details see Marktmodell Aktien, Xetra R ° Release 7.1.
9Theone-unitcharacteristicissimplytoreducenotation. Inprinciplethemodelcandealwithmultiple-
unit orders, too.
9while the execution of an order involves an order execution cost ce ¸ 0.
Regarding the characteristics of agents, HMSS make the following assumptions: a-
gents are risk-neutral and endowed only with public information contained in the in-
formation set zt = (xt,wt), where zt follows a stationary Markov process and xt and wt
denote ﬁnite-dimensional vectors of exogenous and endogenous state variables.10 The
endogenous state variables wt are chosen as to predict the outcomes of order submis-
sions in t, while the purpose of the exogenous state variables xt is to predict the distri-
bution of the common value innovations introduced above as well as the trader arrival
rates and the private value distribution of traders presented in the following. Traders
arrive sequentially with a conditional trader arrival rate equal to
lim
Dt!0
Pr(Trader arrives in [t,t + Dt) j xt)
Dt
= l(t;xt). (1)
They differ in their valuations vt of the stock, which are decomposed as follows
vt = yt + ut, (2)
where yt is the above introduced underlying value of the stock and ut denotes a trader
speciﬁc private valuation of the stock drawn from the conditional distribution
Pr(ut · u j xt) ´ G(u j xt) (3)
with its corresponding density denoted as g(ujxt). Once trader t arrived at the market,
his valuation vt remains ﬁxed and he chooses between buy or sell market order submis-
sions and a variety of buy or sell limit order submissions. His order choice is formalized
with the help of decision indicators: dsell
t,s 2 f0,1g with the ﬁnite set of available sell or-
der submissions s = 0,1,...,S and d
buy
t,b 2 f0,1g with the ﬁnite set of available buy order
submissions b = 0,1,...,B. If dsell
t,s = 0 for all s this signals that no sell order is submitted
at t. The time t submission of a sell market order at price psell
t,0 is indicated by dsell
t,0 = 1,
10A Markov process obeys the so-called Markov property that implies that the future of the process,
given the present, is independent of the past (cp. Spanos (1986)).
10while dsell
t,s = 1 represents the time t submission of a sell limit order at price psell
t,s , a price
s ticks above the current best bid quote. The buy side indicator works similarly.
Trades exhibit the following characteristics: a limit order submitted at time t either
executes at the random execution time t + texecute or cancels at the random cancelation
time t+ tcancel. The cancelation of an order does not occur later than t+ DT, i.e. tcancel is
bounded from above by DT. The execution of an order requires that texecute · tcancel and
the order is canceled otherwise which can be summarized with the help of the indicator
function
It(texecute · tcancel) =
8
> <
> :
1, if t + texecute · t + tcancel,
0, otherwise.
(4)
The conditional distributions of the latent execution and cancelation times illustrated
for the case of an arbitrary buy limit order
Pr(t + texecute · t + t j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1) = Fexecute(t j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1), (5)
Pr(t + tcancel · t + t j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1) = Fcancel(t j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1) (6)
show that the limit order’s outcome (execution or cancelation) is uncertain and depends
on the state vector zt as well as on the trader’s order submission. As a consequence
of this uncertainty, the trader submitting the above presented arbitrary buy limit order
faces the risk of non-execution represented by the execution probability
y
buy
b (zt) ´ IE[It(texecute · tcancel) j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1], (7)
and the picking off risk
x
buy
b (zt) ´ IE[It(texecute · tcancel)(yt+texecute ¡ yt) j zt,d
buy
t,b = 1], (8)
both conditional on the state vector zt and the order submission. The latter can be ex-
11pressed in terms of the conditional execution probability as follows
x
buy
b (zt) = IE[(yt+texecute ¡ yt) j It(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zt,d
buy
t,b = 1]y
buy
b (zt).11 (9)
The trader’s order submission choice depends on the utility he realizes as a conse-
quence of the submission of a particular order. In the case of the exemplary buy order
the trader’s realized utility is given by
It(texecute · tcancel)(yt+texecute + ut ¡ p
buy
t,b ¡ ce) ¡ c0
= It(texecute · tcancel)(yt + ut ¡ p
buy
t,b ¡ ce)
+It(texecute · tcancel)(yt+texecute ¡ yt) ¡ c0, (10)
where the term on the second line reﬂects the payoff that the trader would earn at im-
mediate execution and the term on the third line is the payoff due to a change in the
common value minus the order submission cost. In the case of non-execution the re-
alized utility is reduced to ¡c0. Using the deﬁnitions of the execution probability and
the picking off risk, the expected utility from submitting a buy order at price p
buy
t,b as a
function of the trader’s valuation yt + ut is given by
U
buy
b (yt + ut;zt) = y
buy
b (zt)(yt + ut ¡ p
buy
t,b ¡ ce) + x
buy
b (zt) ¡ c0. (11)
The expected utility from submitting a sell order at price psell
t,s is derived similarly and
looks as follows
Usell
s (yt + ut;zt) = ysell
s (zt)(psell
t,s ¡ yt ¡ ut ¡ ce) ¡ xsell
s (zt) ¡ c0. (12)
Given a realization of his valuation of the stock yt + ut and given a certain state of
the world zt, trader t behaves as expected utility maximizer in order to determine his
11This expression is a result of an application of the law of iterated expectation: IE[IE[ . jF1]jF0] =
IE[ . jF0], where the information sets F1 = [zt,d
buy
t,b ] and F0 = [It(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zt,d
buy
t,b ]. The
additional condition on order execution is obvious since the picking off risk only hurts if the order is
executed.
12optimal order submission strategy. He solves the following representative optimization
problem:
max
fdsell
t,s g,fd
buy
t,b g
S
å
s=0
dsell
t,s Usell
s (yt + ut;zt) +
B
å
b=0
d
buy
t,b U
buy
b (yt + ut;zt), (13)
subject to
S
å
s=0
dsell
t,s +
B
å
b=0
d
buy
t,b · 1, (14)
whereequation(14)reﬂectstheone-shotmarketcharacteristic. Denotefdsell¤
s (yt+ut;zt),
d
buy¤
b (yt + ut;zt)g as this optimization problem’s solutions. Considering the whole pop-
ulation of expected utility maximizing traders who have different valuations for the
stock, the randomness of yt + ut spans a whole set of potential optimal order submis-
sions: S¤(zt) = fs0(zt),s1(zt),...,sS(zt)g and B¤(zt) = fb0(zt),b1(zt),...,bB(zt)g with
indices sorted by decreasing execution probability. This set of potential optimal order
submissions is a subset of the set of available order submissions reduced by those order
submissions that are not optimal for anybody.12
Holliﬁeld, Miller, and Sand˚ as (2004) show that the traders’ optimal order submission
strategies can be represented by threshold valuations, i.e. valuations of the stock that
mark the limits of intervals within which speciﬁc order types are submitted. In other
words, traders with valuations ranging in the same interval submit orders of the same
type. Holliﬁeld, Miller, and Sand˚ as (2004) further show that optimal order submissions
exhibit a monotonicity property in the sense that traders with extremely low private
valuations submit sell orders with high execution probabilities while traders with ex-
tremely high private valuations submit buy orders with high execution probabilities.
The less extreme the trader’s private valuation the less probable the execution of the
order submitted such that traders with intermediate private valuations either submit no
order or limit orders with low execution probabilities. The monotonicity property in
its complete elegance ensures that the threshold valuations form a monotone sequence
12Remember that the set of available order submissions was described by the decision indicators dsell
t,s 2
f0,1g for s = 0,1,...,S and d
buy
t,b 2 f0,1g for b = 0,1,...,B, where s and b index the ﬁnite set of available
order submissions.
13and that order submissions are uniquely related to threshold intervals, a property that
is useful for the subsequent construction of the market efﬁciency measures in terms of
the gains from trade.13
The computation of such threshold valuations is based on pairwise expected utility
comparisons for alternative order submissions. The thresholds, denoted by q, are the
valuations associated with indifference between two possible order submissions. Con-
sider e.g. a sell order submitted at price psell
t,si¡1(zt) and a sell order submitted at price
psell
t,si(zt), then a trader is indifferent between both orders if
Usell
si¡1(zt)(yt + ut;zt) = Usell
si(zt)(yt + ut;zt)
ysell
si¡1(zt)(zt)(psell
t,si¡1(zt) ¡ yt ¡ ut ¡ ce) = ysell
si(zt)(zt)(psell
t,si(zt) ¡ yt ¡ ut ¡ ce)
¡xsell
si¡1(zt)(zt) ¡ c0 ¡xsell
si(zt)(zt) ¡ c0. (15)
Solving equation (15) for yt + ut delivers the threshold valuation at which trader t is
indifferent between the submission of a sell order at price psell
t,si¡1(zt) and a sell order at
price psell
t,si(zt)
qsell
si¡1(zt),si(zt)(zt)
= yt + ut
= psell
t,si¡1(zt) ¡ ce ¡
³
psell
t,si(zt) ¡ psell
t,si¡1(zt)
´
ysell
si(zt)(zt) +
³
xsell
si¡1(zt)(zt) ¡ xsell
si(zt)(zt)
´
ysell
si¡1(zt)(zt) ¡ ysell
si(zt)(zt)
(16)
which is a function of order prices, trader t’s subjective beliefs about execution prob-
abilities and picking off risks and the order submission and execution costs. Similarly
derived, the threshold valuation associated with indifference between a sell order sub-
13In their empirical application Holliﬁeld, Miller, and Sand˚ as (2004) give evidence for the validity of the
monotonicity property at least for buy and sell orders considered separately. They reject the monotonicity
restrictions for buy and sell orders considered jointly and argue that this is due to inadequacies of the
model to some extent.
14mitted at price psell
t,si(zt) and no order submission is given by
qsell
si(zt),no(zt) = psell
t,si(zt) ¡ ce ¡
xsell
si(zt)(zt) + c0
ysell
si(zt)(zt)
. (17)
The threshold valuation associated with indifference between the submission of a buy
order submitted at price p
buy
t,bi¡1(zt) and a buy order submitted at price p
buy
t,bi(zt) looks as
follows
q
buy
bi¡1(zt),bi(zt)(zt)
= p
buy
t,bi¡1(zt) + ce +
³
p
buy
t,bi¡1(zt) ¡ p
buy
t,bi(zt)
´
y
buy
bi(zt)(zt) +
³
x
buy
bi(zt)(zt) ¡ x
buy
bi¡1(zt)(zt)
´
y
buy
bi¡1(zt)(zt) ¡ y
buy
bi(zt)(zt)
(18)
while the threshold valuation associated with indifference between the submission of a
buy order at price p
buy
t,bi(zt) and no order submission is given by
q
buy
bi(zt),no(zt) = p
buy
t,bi(zt) + ce ¡
x
buy
bi(zt)(zt) ¡ c0
y
buy
bi(zt)(zt)
. (19)
The case of indifference between the submission of a buy order at price p
buy
t,bi(zt) and the
submission of a sell order at price psell
t,si(zt) is captured by the threshold
qsi(zt),bi(zt)(zt)
=
³
p
buy
t,bi(zt)y
buy
bi(zt)(zt) + psell
t,si(zt)ysell
si(zt)(zt)
´
+ ce
³
y
buy
bi(zt)(zt) ¡ ysell
si(zt)(zt)
´
ysell
si(zt)(zt) + y
buy
bi(zt)(zt)
¡
³
x
buy
bi(zt)(zt) ¡ xsell
si(zt)(zt)
´
ysell
si(zt)(zt) + y
buy
bi(zt)(zt)
. (20)
To illustrate the link between traders’ valuations for the stock and their optimal order
submission strategies, consider the case for which the set of optimal order submissions
is described by S¤(zt) = fs0(zt),sS(zt)g and B¤(zt) = fb0(zt),bB(zt)g, i.e. some traders
ﬁnd it optimal to submit buy or sell market orders at prices p
buy¤
t,b0(zt) and psell¤
t,s0(zt), while
15others ﬁnd it optimal to submit marginal buy or sell limit orders at prices p
buy¤
t,bB(zt) and
psell¤
t,sS(zt). Under the validity of the monotonicity property the optimal order submission
strategies of traders with different valuations vt = yt + ut for an asset illustrated in
terms of threshold valuations can look as cases (a) and (b) in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: Optimal order submission strategies in a LOB market
vt = yt + ut
6
?
¡¥
¥
¾
buy MO submission
at price p
buy¤
t,b0(zt)
qsell
sS(zt),s0(zt)(zt)
¾
buy LO submission
at price p
buy¤
t,bB(zt)
¾ no buy order sub-
mission
- no sell order sub-
mission
qsell
sS(zt),no(zt)
- sell LO submission
at price psell¤
t,sS(zt)
q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt)
- sell MO submission
at price psell¤
t,s0(zt)
q
buy
bB(zt),b0(zt)(zt)
(a) qsell
sS(zt),no(zt) · q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt)
vt = yt + ut
6
?
¡¥
¥
qsell
sS(zt),s0(zt)(zt)
¾
buy MO submission
at price p
buy¤
t,b0(zt)
¾
buy LO submission
at price p
buy¤
t,bB(zt)
qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt)
- sell LO submission
at price psell¤
t,sS(zt)
q
buy
bB(zt),b0(zt)(zt)
- sell MO submission
at price psell¤
t,s0(zt)
(b) q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt) · qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt) · qsell
sS(zt),no(zt)
Before shedding light on the cases’ differences the focus lies on their similarities: in
both cases the threshold valuations form a monotone sequence on the valuation axis
vt = yt + ut such that order submissions are uniquely related to threshold intervals.
16More precisely, the ﬁgure has to be read as follows: given a realization of the common
value of the stock yt the realization of trader t’s private value of the stock ut determines
his optimal order submission strategy via the interval his valuation vt lies in.
Consider for example the interval [q
buy
bB(zt),b0(zt)(zt),+¥) that implies for a given yt
extremely high private valuations ut, then traders with valuations vt ranging within this
interval will submit buy market orders at price p
buy¤
t,b0 (zt) since they exhibit the highest
execution probability. Similarly, traders with extremely low private valuations ut exhibit
valuations vt that range within the interval (¡¥,qsell
sS(zt),s0(zt)(zt)) such that they submit
sell market orders at price psell¤
t,s0 (zt). Traders with intermediate private valuations ut
either submit no order or orders with low execution probabilities. At this point cases
(a) and (b) need to be distinguished.
Case (a) shows traders’ optimal order submission strategies in a LOB market for
qsell
sS(zt),no(zt) · q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt) suchthatthereisarangeofvaluations, namely qsell
sS(zt),no(zt) ·
vt < q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt), within which no orders are submitted. Hence, for a given yt traders
with intermediate private valuations ut either submit no order if their valuations vt
range within [qsell
sS(zt),no(zt),q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt)) or they submit buy or sell limit orders with low
execution probabilities if their valuations vt range within [q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt),q
buy
bB(zt),b0(zt)(zt))
or[qsell
sS(zt),s0(zt)(zt),qsell
sS(zt),no(zt)). Case(b) showstraders’optimalordersubmissionstrate-
gies in a LOB market for q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt) · qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt) · qsell
sS(zt),no(zt) such that for any
possible valuation a trader submits some order: for a given yt traders with intermedi-
ate private valuations ut either submit a buy limit order if their private valuations ut
lie within [qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt),q
buy
bB(zt),b0(zt)(zt)) or a sell limit order if their private valuations
ut lie within [qsell
sS(zt),s0(zt)(zt),qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt)). To capture the distinction of optimal or-
der submissions for intermediate private valuations, deﬁne as marginal thresholds for
sellers and buyers
q
buy
marginal(zt) = max(qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt),q
buy
bB(zt),no(zt)),
qsell
marginal(zt) = min(qsS(zt),bB(zt)(zt),qsell
sS(zt),no(zt)).
(21)
The optimal order submission strategies in terms of threshold valuations in the gen-
17eral case, i.e. allowing for the full set of potential optimal order submissions S¤(zt) =
fs0(zt),s1(zt),...,sS(zt)g and B¤(zt) = fb0(zt),b1(zt),...,bB(zt)g, can formally be sum-
marized as follows:
dsell¤
s (yt + ut;zt) = 0, for s 62 S¤(zt) (22)
dsell¤
0 (yt + ut;zt) =
8
> <
> :
1, if ¡ ¥ · yt + ut < qsell
s0(zt),s1(zt)(zt),
0, otherwise,
(23)
dsell¤
si(zt)(yt + ut;zt) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1, if si(zt) 62 f0,sS(zt)g and
qsell
si¡1(zt),si(zt)(zt) · yt + ut < qsell
si(zt),si+1(zt)(zt),
0, otherwise,
(24)
dsell¤
sS(zt)(yt + ut;zt) =
8
> <
> :
1, if qsell
sS¡1(zt),sS(zt)(zt) · yt + ut < qsell
marginal(zt),
0, otherwise,
(25)
for the sell side of the market, with the buy side looking similarly.
3.2 Construction of Market Efﬁciency Measures
HMSS use as market efﬁciency measures the gains from trade at an order driven stock
exchange, namely current gains CG, as a percentage of the theoretical benchmarks of
either the maximum possible, denoted as maximum gains MaG, or monopoly-induced
gains from trade, called monopoly gains MoG:
Market efﬁciency measure I =
CG
MaG
£ 100[%], (26)
Market efﬁciency measure II =
CG
MoG
£ 100[%]. (27)
To guard against confusion, what HMSS sloppily call current, maximum and monopoly
gains are not the gains from trade accruing from a transaction in the respective market
form as a whole, but rather quantiﬁcations of how much we expect a single trader with
unknown valuation for an asset to contribute to the gains from trade in the three market
18forms. How the market efﬁciency measures’ ingredients can be derived on the basis of
the above described theoretical relations is presented in the following.
In the LOB market gains from trade accrue as a consequence of transactions between
market and limit order traders. Consider for example a sell market order trader with
private valuation usell
t+t and a buy limit order trader with private valuation u
buy
t who
transact at time t+t at price p
buy
t,b = psell
t+t,0. Under these conditions the exchange surplus
in terms of the traders’ realized utilities is given by
(psell
t+t,0 ¡ yt+t ¡ usell
t+t ¡ ce ¡ c0) + (yt+t + u
buy
t ¡ p
buy
t,b ¡ ce ¡ c0)
= (¡usell
t+t ¡ ce ¡ c0) + (u
buy
t ¡ ce ¡ c0), (28)
with the seller’s contribution to the gains from trade equal to ¡usell
t+t ¡ ce ¡ c0 and the
buyer’s contribution to the gains from trade equal to u
buy
t ¡ ce ¡ c0. The result for a sell
limit order executing with a buy market order looks similarly, whereas in the case of a
non-executing limit order the limit order trader’s contribution to the gains from trade is
negative and given by ¡c0.
However, whatHMSScallcurrentgainsfromtraderealizedinstate zt isnottrader t’s
ex-post contribution to the gains from trade that accrues as a consequence of a particular
trade, but his expected contribution to the gains from trade in a given state before his
valuation is known. Consider a trader with unknown valuation vt = yt + ut arriving
at state zt, then it is the randomness of his valuation that spans a whole set of poten-
tial optimal order submissions, which in turn together with the appropriate execution
probabilities span a whole set of potential contributions to the gains from trade. Taking
expectations conditional on zt over the set of potential contributions to the gains from
trade delivers what is deﬁned as current gains from trade:
CG(zt) = IE
2
6
4
å
S
s=0 dsell¤
s (yt + ut;zt)
¡
ysell
s (zt)(¡ut ¡ ce) ¡ c0
¢
+å
B
b=0 d
buy¤
b (yt + ut;zt)
³
y
buy
b (zt)(ut ¡ ce) ¡ c0
´ zt
3
7
5. (29)
Equation (29) depends on zt but the computation of the ﬁnal market efﬁciency measures
19from (26) and (27) requires an expression for the unconditional current gains from trade,
i.e. a quantiﬁcation of how much a single trader arriving in t with unknown valuation
for an asset is expected to contribute to the gains from trade without knowing the real-
ization of zt, expectations across all zt need to be taken to deliver
CG = IE[CG(zt)jTrader arrives and submits an order], (30)
the unconditional expected current gains from trade.
The maximum gains from trade can be achieved in a perfectly liquid market which
only exists as a theoretical benchmark delivering an upper bound on the gains from
trade attainable in any real world trading mechanism. In order to determine the ex-
pected contribution of a single trader with unknown valuation for the stock arriving in
state xt to the maximum gains from trade, a link between his optimal order submission
strategy and his valuation for the stock in this market form is needed. To provide this
link, the stock allocation is described with the help of the indicator function:
Isell(ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, if a trader with private value ut sells the stock in state xt,
0, otherwise,
(31)
with the buy indicator function deﬁned similarly. The stock allocation that delivers the
maximum expected gains from trade for trader t is derived by solving the following
optimization problem
max
fIsell(ut;xt),Ibuy(ut;xt)g
IE
h
Isell(ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0) + Ibuy(ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0) j xt
i
, (32)
subject to
Isell(ut;xt) + Ibuy(ut;xt) · 1, for all ut, (33)
IE
h
Isell(ut;xt) j xt
i
= IE
h
Ibuy(ut;xt) j xt
i
, (34)
where (33) represents the one-shot market characteristic and (34) is the market clearing
20condition. Assuming the distribution of trader t’s private valuation for the stock to be
continuous and symmetric with median zero, then HMSS show that the optimal stock
allocation of trader t is given by
Isell¤(ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, for ut · ¡ce ¡ c0,
0, otherwise,
(35)
Ibuy¤(ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, for ut ¸ ce + c0,
0, otherwise.
(36)
These results deliver the link between trader t’s valuation for the stock and his optimal
order submission strategy in the perfectly liquid market that is needed to assess trader
t’s expected contribution to the maximum gains from trade. As in the case of the current
gains from trade, the randomness of trader t’s private valuation for the stock implies
that, via the randomness of the optimal order submission strategy, his contribution to
the maximum gains from trade is also random. Taking expectations conditional on xt
overthepotentialcontributionstothegainsfromtradedeliverswhatiscalledmaximum
gains from trade:
MaG(xt) = IE
2
6
4
Isell¤(ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
+Ibuy¤(ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
xt
3
7
5. (37)
As in the case of the current gains from trade expectations across all states xt need to be
taken to deliver
MaG = IE[MaG(xt)jTrader arrives and submits an order], (38)
the unconditional expected maximum gains from trade which are needed to compute
the ﬁnal market efﬁciency measure from (26).14
14In addition HMSS provide the means for a decomposition of the losses, measured as the difference
between the maximum and current gains from trade, into the four sources (i) no execution, (ii) no sub-
mission, (iii) wrong direction and (iv) extramarginal submission. This master thesis abstains from doing
so for shortage of space.
21The monopoly gains from trade result from a market in which liquidity is supplied
by a proﬁt maximizing monopolist. In this market form traders are price takers in the
sense that market prices are exogenous. In order to determine the expected contribu-
tion of a single trader with unknown valuation for the stock arriving in state xt to the
monopoly gains from trade, trader t’s optimal response to the monopolist’s proﬁt max-
imizing quotes, the bid bm
t and the ask am
t , as a function of his valuation for the stock
needs to be found. To provide this link, the order submission strategy of trader t is
described with the help of the following indicator function:
Im,sell(bm
t ;ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, if a trader with private value ut sells the stock in state xt,
0, otherwise,
(39)
with the buy indicator function deﬁned similarly. The monopolist determines his proﬁt
maximizing quotes by solving the following optimization problem
max
fbm
t ,am
t g
IE
h
Im,sell(bm
t ;ut;xt)(yt ¡ bm
t ) + Im,buy(am
t ;ut;xt)(am
t ¡ yt)
i
, (40)
subject to
IE
h
Im,sell(bm
t ;ut;xt) j xt
i
= IE
h
Im,buy(am
t ;ut;xt) j xt
i
, (41)
where (41) is the market clearing condition. Assuming the distribution of trader t’s
private valuation for the stock to be continuous and symmetric with median zero, then
HMSS show that the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing quotes are given by
bm¤
t = yt ¡
G(bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
g(bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
, (42)
am¤
t = yt +
1¡ G(am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ ytjxt)
g(am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ ytjxt)
, (43)
22while trader t’s optimal order submission strategy is described by
Im,sell(bm¤
t ;ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, for u · bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ yt
0, otherwise,
(44)
Im,buy(am¤
t ;ut;xt) =
8
> <
> :
1, for u ¸ am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ yt
0, otherwise.
(45)
These results deliver trader t’s optimal response to the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing
quotes as a function of his private valuation for the stock which is needed to assess
trader t’s expected contribution to the monopoly gains from trade. Once again it is
the randomness of trader t’s private valuation for the stock that implies not only the
randomness of the optimal order submission strategy, but also the fact that trader t’s
contribution to the monopoly gains from trade is random. Taking expectations condi-
tional on xt over the potential contributions to the gains from trade delivers what is
called monopoly gains from trade:
MoG(xt) = IE
2
6
4
Im,sell(bm¤
t ;ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
+Im,buy(am¤
t ;ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
xt
3
7
5. (46)
Once again, as for the current and the maximum gains from trade, expectations across
all states xt need to be taken to deliver
MoG = IE[MoG(xt)jTrader arrives and submits an order], (47)
the unconditional expected monopoly gains from trade which are needed to compute
the ﬁnal market efﬁciency measure from (27).
In the sense that the hypothetical benchmark of the maximum gains from trade pro-
vides an upper bound on the gains from trade attainable in any feasible mechanism, the
monopoly gains from trade may not exactly match the concept of minimum possible
gains from trade that are conceivable theoretically. Nevertheless, they provide a lower
23bound on the gains from trade attainable in any feasible mechanism since a monopoly
market is by far the most unproﬁtable environment for agents to trade in reality.
With the ingredients derived, the market efﬁciency measures as introduced above
can be constructed at least theoretically. How numbers can be attached to these theoret-
ical constructs is subject of the next section.
4 RecipeforEstimatingtheGainsfromTradeinXetraLOB
Market
4.1 Econometric Implementation
This paragraph deals with the econometric implementation of the theoretical model in
order to provide closed form solutions of the above presented theoretical market efﬁ-
ciency measures. In the course of this paragraph ﬁrst the two step estimation procedure
proposed by HMSS will be presented in detail as to provide a structured recipe for the
planned application to the Xetra trading system. Second the data requirements to im-
plement the estimation procedure will be summarized.
First Step Estimation
On the one hand the ﬁrst step estimation comprises the maximum likelihood estimation
of a competing risks model for the latent cancelation and execution times.15 On the
other hand it implies the ordinary least squares estimation of regression models for the
expected common value changes conditional on order execution. The former delivers
formulations of the distribution functions of latent cancelation and execution times that
allow to compute estimates of the execution probabilities of distinct order types. The
latter makes possible to compute estimates of the common value changes conditional
on order execution. Both the estimates of the execution probabilities and the estimates
of the common value changes are used to compute estimates of the respective picking
15For a brief summary of competing risks model theory essentials see appendix A.1.
24off risks. The procedure of the ﬁrst step estimation is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 with the
steps 1.1 through 1.5 described in detail subsequently.16
1.1 MLE of competing risks models for latent cancelation and execution times
In the present application the cancelation and the execution of an order constitute two
reasons for an order to quit the LOB. In competing risks models’ terminology these
reasons are called failure types which occur at the random failure times
t + tcancel : latent cancelation time, (48)
t + texecute : latent execution time. (49)
Core of the maximum likelihood estimations of the competing risks models for the la-
tent cancelation and execution times are the corresponding log-likelihood functions as
given for a general competing risks model in equation (96) in appendix A.1.1. The log-
likelihood functions’ ingredients, i.e. the cancelation and execution hazard rates com-
pare their general formulation in equation (98) in appendix A.1.1, are computed for the
sets of conditioning information fzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1g, fzt,dsell
t,1 = 1g, fzt,d
buy
t,B(zt) = 1g and
fzt,dsell
t,S(zt) = 1g in this application.
For the purpose of illustration, the computation of the hazard rates and the forma-
tion of the log-likelihood function are presented for the conditioning information set
fzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1g, i.e. conditional on zt and the submission of a one-tick buy limit order.
The latent execution and cancelation times of this order type are assumed to follow in-
dependent conditional Weibull distributions that look as in equations (50) and (51):
Fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) = 1¡ exp
µ
¡exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )ta
buy
1
¶
(50)
16The parameter estimates required for the computation of both the estimates of the execution proba-
bilities and the estimates of the picking off risks are derived for the one-tick and the marginal buy and
sell limit orders (that execute) only, constituting a subset of the event data set indexed by j = 1,..., J
(l = 1,..., L). These are sufﬁcient to derive upper and lower bounds of the current gains from trade as
well as the average current gains from trade for each zti of the full sample indexed by i = 1,..., I. For
further explanations see section 4.2.
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27Fexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) = 1¡ exp
µ
¡exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )tb
buy
1
¶
(51)
with densities as given in equations (52) and (53):
fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) = exp
µ
¡exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )ta
buy
1
¶µ
exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )a
buy
1 ta
buy
1 ¡1
¶
, (52)
fexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) = exp
µ
¡exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )tb
buy
1
¶µ
exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )b
buy
1 tb
buy
1 ¡1
¶
, (53)
where g
buy
1 and k
buy
1 are coefﬁcient vectors of the same dimension as the state vector
zt that measure the effects of the state variables on the corresponding hazard rates.
a
buy
1 and b
buy
1 are scalar Weibull shape parameters and can be interpreted as follows: if
a
buy
1 (b
buy
1 ) = 1, then the corresponding hazard rate is independent of t. If a
buy
1 (b
buy
1 ) <
1, then the corresponding hazard rate is decreasing in t. If a
buy
1 (b
buy
1 ) > 1, then the
corresponding hazard rate is increasing in t.
The hazard rates for the latent cancelation and execution times for the exemplary
one-tick buy limit order can be computed as shown in the following:
hcancel(t + t;zt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) =
fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
1¡ Fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
=
exp
³
¡exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )ta
buy
1
´³
exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )a
buy
1 ta
buy
1 ¡1
´
1¡
³
1¡ exp
³
¡exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )ta
buy
1
´´
= exp(z0
tg
buy
1 )a
buy
1 ta
buy
1 ¡1, (54)
hexecute(t + t;zt,d
buy
t,1 = 1) =
fexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
1¡ Fexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
=
exp
³
¡exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )tb
buy
1
´³
exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )b
buy
1 tb
buy
1 ¡1
´
1¡
³
1¡ exp
³
¡exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )tb
buy
1
´´
= exp(z0
tk
buy
1 )b
buy
1 tb
buy
1 ¡1. (55)
To construct the log-likelihood function suppose J orders indexed by j = 1,..., J give
28rise to data [tj + tj, Itj(texecute > tcancel), Itj(texecute · tcancel),ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1] containing
all one-tick buy limit orders of the sample, where tj + tj is the observed failure time,
Itj(texecute > tcancel) is an indicator function for the cancelation of the jth one-tick buy
limit order, Itj(texecute · tcancel) is an indicator function for the execution of the jth one-
tick buy limit order and fztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1g is the associated conditioning information.17 18
Then with equation (96) in appendix A.1.1 the conditional log-likelihood function used
to estimate the probability distributions of the latent cancelation and latent execution
times of the exemplary one-tick buy limit orders is given by
logL(. j ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1)
=
J
å
j=1
n
Itj(texecute > tcancel)ln
³
hcancel(tj + tj;ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1)
´
+ Itj(texecute · tcancel)ln
³
hexecute(tj + tj;ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1)
´
¡
Z tj+tj
0
³
hcancel(s;ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1) + hexecute(s;ztj,d
buy
tj,1 = 1)
´
ds
¾
. (57)
In order to provide estimates of the Weibull parameters a
buy
1 , b
buy
1 , g
buy
1 and k
buy
1 , equa-
tion (57) is estimated by maximum likelihood for one-tick buy limit orders treating or-
ders that last longer than the prespeciﬁed time span DT as censored observations.
The hazard rates and the log-likelihood functions on the basis of the conditioning in-
formation sets fzt,dsell
t,1 = 1g, fzt,d
buy
t,B(zt) = 1g and fzt,dsell
t,S(zt) = 1g can be derived equiv-
alently. The remaining parameters to be estimated are asell
1 , bsell
1 , gsell
1 , ksell
1 , a
buy
marginal,
b
buy
marginal, g
buy
marginal, k
buy
marginal, asell
marginal, bsell
marginal, gsell
marginal and ksell
marginal.
17Itj(texecute · tcancel) is deﬁned in (4), while It(texecute > tcancel) is given by
It(texecute > tcancel) =
½
1, if t + texecute > t + tcancel,
0, otherwise. (56)
18Note that here the notation is simpliﬁed in that the index j is used for the subset of one-tick buy limit
orders, but lateron also for the subsets of one-tick sell, marginal buy and marginal sell limit orders to
avoid more complex and confusing indices.
291.2 Computation of estimates of execution probabilities
Pretending to know neither the failure time nor the failure type of an order submitted at
t, i.e. treating the execution of an order as random variable, then the execution proba-
bilities of all order submissions of interest can be obtained by taking expectations of the
random order execution as illustrated for the exemplary one-tick buy limit order:
IE
h
It(texecute · tcancel)jzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1
i
=
Z +¥
¡¥
It(texecute · tcancel)f
It(texecute·tcancel)jzt,d
buy
t,1 =1dt
=
Z DT
0
It(texecute · tcancel)f
It(texecute·tcancel)jzt,d
buy
t,1 =1dt
=
Z DT
0
1¢ f
It(texecute·tcancel)jzt,d
buy
t,1 =1dt
=
Z DT
0
³
1¡ Fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
´
¢
³
dFexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
´
(58)
The second line provides the deﬁnition of the conditional expectation of a continuous
random variable, while line three results as a consequence of the failure time to be
bounded from below by 0 and from above by DT. In line four the indicator function
is replaced by the value 1 standing for order execution while the 0 for otherwise can be
neglected. Line ﬁve replaces the joint probability that the order has not yet been can-
celed by t + t and executes between t + t and t + t + Dt, f
It(texecute·tcancel)jzt,d
buy
t,1 =1dt, by
the product of the marginal probabilities
³
1¡ Fcancel(tjzt,d
buy
t,1 = 1)
´
¢dFexecute(tjzt,d
buy
t,1
= 1), where the ﬁrst element is the probability that the order has not yet been canceled
by t + t while the second denotes the probability that the order executes between t + t
and t + t + Dt.19 Taking the expectations for the one-tick sell limit order and the mar-
ginal buy and sell limit orders can be conducted similarly.
The estimates of the execution probabilities of the one-tick and the marginal buy and
sell limit orders are obtained by replacing the theoretical distribution functions as il-
lustrated for the exemplary one-tick buy limit order in (58) by their respective Weibull
speciﬁcations evaluated at the parameter estimates derived in 1.1. The resulting execu-
19This holds because of assuming independence between the latent execution and cancelation times.
30tion probability estimates of the one-tick buy limit order
ˆ y
buy
1 (zti) =
Z DT
0
exp
µ
¡exp(z0
ti ˆ g
buy
1 )t
ˆ a
buy
1
i
¶
¢
exp
µ
¡exp(z0
ti ˆ k
buy
1 )t
ˆ b
buy
1
i
¶µ
exp(z0
ti ˆ k
buy
1 ) ˆ b
buy
1 t
ˆ b
buy
1 ¡1
i
¶
dti, (59)
andthoseoftheone-ticksellandthemarginalbuyandselllimitorders ˆ ysell
1 (zti), ˆ y
buy
marginal
(zti) and ˆ ysell
1 (zti) are each computed for all order submissions in the sample indexed by
i = 1,..., I, no matter if submitted as one-tick or marginal buy or sell limit order or not.
1.3 OLS of regression models for common value changes
The expected common value changes conditional on order execution are parameterized
as linear regression models. Suppose L orders indexed by l = 1,..., L give rise to data
[ytl,yt+texecutel,ztl, Itl(texecute · tcancel) = 1,d
buy
tl,1,dsell
tl,1,d
buy
tl,B(ztl),dsell
tl,S(ztl)] containingone-tick
and marginal buy and sell limit orders that execute, then the four regression models
IE
h
(yt+texecutel ¡ ytl)jItl(texecute · tcancel) = 1,ztl,d
buy
tl,1 = 1
i
= z0
tlL
buy
1 (60)
IE
h
(yt+texecutel ¡ ytl)jItl(texecute · tcancel) = 1,ztl,dsell
tl,1 = 1
i
= z0
tlLsell
1 (61)
IE
h
(yt+texecutel ¡ ytl)jItl(texecute · tcancel) = 1,ztl,d
buy
tl,B(zt) = 1
i
= z0
tlL
buy
marginal (62)
IE
h
(yt+texecutel ¡ ytl)jItl(texecute · tcancel) = 1,ztl,dsell
tl,S(zt) = 1
i
= z0
tlLsell
marginal (63)
can be estimated by OLS to provide estimates of L
buy
1 , Lsell
1 , L
buy
marginal and Lsell
marginal.
1.4 Computation of estimates of common value changes
Suppose I ordersindexedby i = 1,..., I giverisetodata [zti] containingthestatevectors
of all order submissions in the sample, then estimates of the expected changes in the
common value at every order submission are delivered for the exemplary one-tick buy
limit order by computing
ˆ IE
h
(yti+ti ¡ yti)jIti(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zti,d
buy
ti,1 = 1
i
= z0
ti
ˆ L
buy
1 . (64)
31The estimates of the common value changes for the sell one-tick and the buy and sell
marginal limit orders at every order submission, i.e. ˆ IE
£
(yti+ti ¡ yti)jIti(texecute ·
tcancel) = 1,zti,dsell
ti,1 = 1
i
, ˆ IE
£
(yti+ti ¡ yti)jIti(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zti,d
buy
ti,B(zt) = 1
i
and ˆ IE
h
(yti+ti ¡ yti)jIti(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zti,dsell
ti,S(zt) = 1
i
, canbecomputedsimilarly.
1.5 Computation of estimates of picking off risks
In order to derive estimates of the picking off risks of the exemplary one-tick buy limit
order at every order submission in the sample indexed by i = 1,..., I, substituting the
appropriate estimates of the execution probabilities and the associated estimates of the
common-value changes into equation (9) delivers:
ˆ x
buy
1 (zti) = ˆ IE
h
(yt+texecutei ¡ yti) j Iti(texecute · tcancel) = 1,zti,d
buy
ti,1 = 1
i
ˆ y
buy
1 (zti). (65)
Similarly, the estimates of the picking off risks of the one-tick sell and the marginal buy
and sell limit orders at every order submission, i.e. ˆ xsell
1 (zti), ˆ x
buy
B(zti)(zti) and ˆ xsell
S(zti)(zti),
are obtained.
Second Step Estimation
The second step estimation deals with the maximum likelihood estimation of a compet-
ing risks model for the timing of market and limit orders that delivers the remaining pa-
rameters needed to actually calculate the market efﬁciency measures from (26) and (27).
The results of the ﬁrst step estimation enter the likelihood function of the second step
estimation via the threshold functions that characterize the optimal order submission
strategies. The estimation of the likelihood function further requires parameterizations
of the trader arrival rates and the private value distribution. The procedure of the sec-
ond step estimation is illustrated in ﬁgure 3 with the steps 2.1 through 2.4 to be handled
described in a detailed recipe provided in the text.
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332.1 Weibull model for trader arrival rate
The trader arrival rate from equation (1) is parameterized as the following Weibull
model
l(t;xti)dt = exp(x0
tid)h(t ¡ ti¡1)h¡1dt, (66)
which supposes that the last order submission was at ti¡1. d is a coefﬁcient vector of
the same dimension as the exogenous state variables xti and measures the effects of the
latter on the hazard rate l(t;xti). The scalar Weibull shape parameter h is interpreted as
in the case of the Weibull formulations for the latent cancelation and execution times.
2.2 Mixture of two normal distributions for private value distribution
The conditional private value distribution from equation (3) is parameterized as a mix-
ture of two normal distributions with mean zero and standard deviations as functions
of the common value and the exogenous state variables
s¤
1(yt,xt) = yts1 exp(x0
tG), (67)
s¤
2(yt,xt) = yts2 exp(x0
tG), (68)
where s1 6= s2, and looks as follows:
G(ujxt) = rF
µ
u
s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ r)F
µ
u
s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
. (69)
The symbol F stands for the normal cumulative distribution function, r satisfying 0 <
r < 1 denotes the weighting factor, while G is a coefﬁcient vector of the same dimension
as the exogenous state vector xt that measures the effect of the latter on the standard
deviations s¤
1(yt,xt) and s¤
2(yt,xt).
2.3 Evaluation of threshold functions at ﬁrst step estimates
Under the assumption that the log-likelihood function for the timing of market and
limit orders will be formed for buy and sell market orders and buy and sell limit orders
34between the one-tick and the marginal limit orders, the threshold valuations needed for
the computation of the log-likelihood function are those illustrated in ﬁgure 4.20
Figure 4: Optimal order submission strategies for MLE of logL(. j zt)
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The ﬁrst step estimates of the execution probabilities ˆ y
buy
1 (zti), ˆ ysell
1 (zti), ˆ y
buy
B(zti)(zti)
and ˆ ysell
S(zti)(zti) for all order submissions in the sample indexed by i = 1,..., I and the
associated ﬁrst step estimates of the picking off risks ˆ x
buy
1 (zti), ˆ xsell
1 (zti), ˆ x
buy
B(zti)(zti) and
ˆ xsell
S(zti)(zti) aresubstitutedintothethresholdfunctionsfromequations(16)to(20)inorder
to deliver formulations of the threshold valuations at every order submission q
buy
1,0 (zti),
q
buy
marginal(zti), qsell
marginal(zti) and qsell
1,0 (zti) leaving solely the parameters c0 and ce to be es-
timated in order to actually compute the respective threshold valuations at every order
submission.
2.4 MLE of competing risks model for timing of market and limit orders
In the present application the submissions of buy and sell market orders and buy and
sell limit orders constitute four reasons (failure types) for a trader to arrive and submit
20Figure 4 illustrates the optimal order submission strategies under validity of the monotonicity prop-
erty (see above).
35an order. In order to set up this competing risks model’s likelihood function, the hazard
rates associated with these order submissions need to be computed.
Given the conditional private value distribution from equation (3) and the trader
arrival rate from equation (1), the conditional probability of the submission of a sell
market order between t and t + dt is given by
Pr(Sell MO in [t,t + dt]jzt)
= Pr(yt + ut < qsell
0,1 ) ¢ Pr(Trader arrives in [t,t + dt) j xt)
= G(qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt) ¢ l(t;xt)dt, (70)
such that the associated hazard rate is equal to
G(qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt)l(t;xt). (71)
The conditional probability of the submission of a sell limit order between the one-tick
and the marginal sell limit order between t and t + dt is given by
Pr(Sell LO in [t,t + dt]jzt)
= Pr(qsell
0,1 · yt + ut < qsell
marginal) ¢ Pr(Trader arrives in [t,t + dt) j xt)
=
h
G(qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt) ¡ G(qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
¢ l(t;xt)dt, (72)
such that the associated hazard rate is equal to
h
G(qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt) ¡ G(qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
l(t;xt). (73)
Similarly derived, the hazard rate for the submission of a buy market order submitted
in t equals
h
1¡ G(q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
l(t;xt), (74)
while the hazard rate for a buy limit order between the one-tick and the marginal buy
36limit order in t is given by
h
G(q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ ytjxt) ¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
l(t;xt). (75)
The hazard rate for the submission of an order of any type is given by the sum of equa-
tions (71), (73), (74) and (75) and equals:
h
1¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt) + G(qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
l(t;xt). (76)
Suppose I orders indexed by i = 1,..., I give rise to data [ti,dsell
ti,s,d
buy
ti,b ,xti] for s =
0,1,...,S(zti) and b = 0,1,...,B(zti) containingallbuyandsellmarketandlimitorders,
where ti is the observed order submission time, dsell
ti,s is an indicator function for the
ith order being a sell order, d
buy
ti,b is an indicator function for the ith order being a buy
order and xti is the associated conditioning information. Then with equation (96) in
appendix A.1.1, the conditional log-likelihood function used to estimate the probability
distributions for the timing of market and limit orders results as
logL(.jzti)
=
I
å
i=1
n
dsell
ti,0 ln
³
G(qsell
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)l(ti;xti)
´
+
0
@
S(zti)
å
s=1
dsell
ti,s
1
Aln
³h
G(qsell
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti) ¡ G(qsell
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
+d
buy
ti,0 ln
³h
1¡ G(q
buy
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
+
0
@
B(zti)
å
b=1
d
buy
ti,b
1
Aln
³h
G(q
buy
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti) ¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
¡
Z ti
ti¡1
h
1¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt) + G(qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ ytjxt)
i
l(t;xt)dt
¾
. (77)
37Assuming that the common value and the state vector only change in the case of
order submission, the log-likelihood function simpliﬁes to
logL(.jzti)
=
I
å
i=1
n
dsell
ti,0 ln
³
G(qsell
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)l(ti;xti)
´
+
0
@
S(zti)
å
s=1
dsell
ti,s
1
Aln
³h
G(qsell
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti) ¡ G(qsell
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
+d
buy
ti,0 ln
³h
1¡ G(q
buy
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
+
0
@
B(zti)
å
b=1
d
buy
ti,b
1
Aln
³h
G(q
buy
0,1 (zti) ¡ ytijxti) ¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i
l(ti;xti)
´
¡
h
1¡ G(q
buy
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti) + G(qsell
marginal(zti) ¡ ytijxti)
i Z ti
ti¡1
l(t;xti)dt
¾
.(78)
Substituting the threshold valuations evaluated at the ﬁrst step parameter estimates,
the parameterization of the conditional private value distribution as well as that of the
trader arrival rate into equation (78) allows to estimate logL(.jzt) by maximum like-
lihood. The remaining parameters to be estimated are the order submission cost c0,
the order execution cost ce, the parameters that characterize the conditional private
value distribution s1, s2, G and r as well as the Weibull parameters of the trader arrival
rate model d and h.21 Given these estimates, the estimates of the threshold valuations
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt), ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt), ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) and ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) at every order submission can be derived
that are needed for the computation of the ﬁnal market efﬁciency measures.
Data Requirements
The structured recipe of the two step estimation procedure reveals which data require-
mentsneedtobefulﬁlledtoactuallyconducttheestimationandtoprovidetheestimates
necessary for the subsequent computation of the market efﬁciency measures. These re-
quirements are summarized in the following.
21The order execution and submission costs are estimated as a percentage of the common value in
HMSS, i.e. ce and c0 are replaced by c
p
e ¢ yt and c
p
0 ¢ yt in the log-likelihood function. Given the estimates
ˆ c
p
e and ˆ c
p
0, ˆ ce and ˆ c0 are delivered by ˆ c
p
e ¢ yt and ˆ c
p
0 ¢ yt.
38In order to estimate the ingredients of the ﬁnal market efﬁciency measures for the
XetraLOBmarket, theavailabilityofaneventdatasetofastocktradedonXetrawith i =
1,..., I observations is necessary containing the time of the initial order submission ti of
each order, the failure time ti + ti of each order, an indicator function for the cancelation
of the ith order Iti(texecute > tcancel), an indicator function for the execution of the ith
order Iti(texecute · tcancel), indicator functions for the type of the ith order dsell
ti,s or d
buy
ti,b
with s = 0,...,S(zti) and b = 0,...,B(zti), a proxy for the stock’s common value at
the time of the submission of the ith order yti as well as at the failure time of the ith
order yti+ti andthecorrespondingexogenousaswellasendogenousstatevariables zti =
(xti,wti).22
In the theoretical model the exogenous state variables xti predict the trader arrival
rates, the distribution of innovations to the common value and the conditional distri-
bution of the traders’ private values. In the empirical application they should be se-
lected in a way that they are likely to be correlated with the traders’ desire to change
their portfolios and with innovations in the stocks’ common value. In the ideal case the
endogenous state variables wti would include the entire LOB and any other variables
known at ti that help to predict the outcomes of order submissions at ti. However, if the
sample is relatively small it is better to use a smaller number of variables in the endoge-
nous state vector wti. Which speciﬁc variables are actually used as state variables for the
Xetra application in the end depends on the choice of the stock for which the analysis is
conducted.23
4.2 Computation of Market Efﬁciency Measures
The theoretical market efﬁciency measures from equations (26) and (27), once imple-
mented empirically, allow to compute standardized and hence comparable measures
that assess the efﬁciency of a real world LOB market. With the ingredients derived
22HMSS use as proxy for yti a centered moving average of the midquotes mqti = (p
buy
ti,0 + psell
ti,0)/2 over a
20-minute window. An adequate speciﬁcation of yt for the Xetra LOB data needs to be found.
23HMSS’s use the TSX mining volatility as exogenous state variable for their application conducted for
stocks that obey strong relations to the mining industry.
39above, this paragraph deals with the computation of closed form solutions of these mea-
sures to actually document the efﬁciency of a real world LOB market like Xetra with
numbers.
The estimate of the current gains from trade ˆ CG(zt) is obtained by substituting the
optimal order submission strategies of the sell side from equations (22) to (25) and the
respective optimal order submission strategies of the buy side, both evaluated at the
parameter estimates delivered in the preceding subparagraph, into the formula for the
current gains from trade delivered in equation (29).24 The resulting estimate equals
ˆ CG(zt)
= IE
h
I(¡¥ < yt + ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt))(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+
S(zt)¡1
å
s=1
IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
s¡1,s(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
s,s+1(zt)
´³
ˆ ysell
s (zt)(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
S(zt)¡1,S(zt)(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt)
´³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut < ¥
´
(ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+
B(zt)¡1
å
b=1
IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
b,b+1(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ q
buy
b¡1,b(zt)
´³
ˆ y
buy
b (zt)(ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ q
buy
B(zt)¡1,B(zt)(zt)
´
³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)(ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
. (79)
24This estimate as well as the followinig estimates of the current gains from trade are computed at every
order submission in the sample indexed by i = 1,..., I. Nonetheless the index i is dropped for reasons of
convenience.
40Using solely the estimates of the execution probabilities for the marginal limit orders
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt) and ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt) for the execution probabilities of all limit orders y
buy
b (zt) and
ysell
s (zt) provides a lower bound for the estimate of the current gains from trade:
ˆ CG(zt) ¸ ˆ CGlb(zt)
= IE
h
I(¡¥ < yt + ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt))(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt)
´³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut < ¥
´
(ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt)
´³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)(ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
, (80)
since the true execution probabilities of orders submitted less far away from the best
quotes than marginal limit orders are greater than the marginal execution probabilities
computed for these orders.
Similarly, usingsolelytheexecutionprobabilitiesfortheone-ticklimitorders ˆ y
buy
1 (zt)
and ˆ ysell
1 (zt) for the execution probabilities of all limit orders y
buy
b (zt) and ysell
s (zt) pro-
vides an upper bound for the estimate of the current gains from trade:
ˆ CG(zt) · ˆ CGub(zt)
= IE
h
I(¡¥ < yt + ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt))(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt)
´³
ˆ ysell
1 (zt)(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut < ¥
´
(ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
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marginal(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt)
´³
ˆ y
buy
1 (zt)(ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
, (81)
since the true execution probabilities of orders submitted farther away from the best
quotes than one-tick limit orders are smaller than one-tick execution probabilities com-
puted for these orders.
41Using the average execution probabilities, i.e. ˆ y
buy
avg(zt) = 0.5¢
³
ˆ y
buy
1 (zt) + ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)
´
and ˆ ysell
avg(zt) = 0.5 ¢
³
ˆ ysell
1 (zt) + ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
´
for the execution probabilities of all limit
orders y
buy
b (zt) and ysell
s (zt) delivers an estimate of the average current gains from trade:
ˆ CGavg(zt)
= IE
h
I(¡¥ < yt + ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt))(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
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´³
ˆ ysell
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´
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+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
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´
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+IE
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³
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´
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i
. (82)
To actually compute the estimates of the lower and upper bounds as well as the
average current gains from trade conditional on zt, equations (80) through (82) need to
be expressed in terms of the private value distribution from equation (69). The closed
form formulas of (80) through (82) as well as their derivation are provided in appendix
A.2.1.25
The estimates of the lower bound ˆ CGlb(zt), upper bound ˆ CGub(zt) and the average
current gains from trade ˆ CGavg(zt) from equation (121) in appendix A.2.1 quantify how
much a single trader arriving in t with unknown valuation for an asset is expected to
contribute to the gains from trade in the respective market form in state zt. To derive
unconditional estimates, i.e. estimates that do not depend on zt, expectations across all
states zt are taken. Taking expectations across zt for the exemplary estimate of the lower
bound of the current gains from trade delivers its unconditional expectation
IE
£ ˆ CGlb(zt)jTrader arrives and submits an order
¤
, (83)
that is conditional on the arrival of a trader who submits an order, since samples de-
livered by electronic limit order book markets like Xetra do not capture the arrival of
traders who abstain from submitting orders. With I being the total number of observa-
25The ready-to-use formulas illustrated in equation (121) are quite space-wasting and their appearance
is superﬂuous at this passage. Nevertheless they are important for the planned empirical implementation.
42tions in the sample, equation (83) can be estimated by its sample analogue
ˆ CGlb =
1
I
I
å
i=1
ˆ CGlb(zti). (84)
The unconditional expected estimates of the upper bound ˆ CGub and the average of the
current gains from trade ˆ CGavg are computed similarly.26
The estimate of the maximum gains from trade can be derived by substituting the
parameterization of the private value distribution from equation (69) evaluated at the
parameter estimates into the formula for the maximum gains from trade in equation
(37). The derivation of the resulting estimate
ˆ MaG(xt)
= ˆ r
µ
2ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (ˆ ce + ˆ c0)2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
2ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (ˆ ce + ˆ c0)2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
. (85)
can be retraced in appendix A.2.2.27 Its unconditional counterpart can be derived as in
the case of the current gains from trade and equals
ˆ MaG =
1
I
I
å
i=1
ˆ MaG(xti), (86)
with I being the total number of observations in the sample.
The estimate of the monopoly gains from trade can be derived by substituting the
parameterization of the private value distribution from equation (69) evaluated at the
parameter estimates and the corresponding density function ﬁrst into the monopolist’s
optimal quotes and second via the traders’ optimal order submission strategies from
equations (44) and (45) into the formula of the monopoly gains from trade given in
26Due to the fact that the sample does not capture trader arrivals that are associated with traders who
abstain from trading, equation (83) and the respective measures for the upper bound and the average of
the current gains from trade as well as the maximum and the monopoly gains from trade are downward
biased. To correct for this bias, HMSS develop a method to reweight their sample. For shortage of space,
this thesis abstains from delivering the reweighting procedure as it is explicitly described in HMSS.
27Note that equation (85) does not report ˆ MaG(zt) as a percentage of the common value as in HMSS
but it delivers ˆ MaG(zt) in absolute terms.
43equation (46). The derivation of the resulting estimate
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can be followed in appendix A.2.3. Its unconditional analogue is obtained by the sample
average
ˆ MoG =
1
I
I
å
i=1
ˆ MoG(xti), (88)
with I being the total number of observations in the sample.
With numbers assessed to the unconditional expected estimates of the upper and
lower bounds as well as to the average of the current gains from trade and with the
unconditional expected estimates of the maximum as well as of the monopoly gains
from trade derived, the upper and lower bounds as well as the average of the ﬁnal
market efﬁciency measures can be computed as follows:
\ Market efﬁciency measure Ilb =
ˆ CGlb
ˆ MaG
£ 100[%], (89)
\ Market efﬁciency measure Iub =
ˆ CGub
ˆ MaG
£ 100[%], (90)
\ Market efﬁciency measure Iavg =
ˆ CGavg
ˆ MaG
£ 100[%], (91)
\ Market efﬁciency measure IIlb =
ˆ CGlb
ˆ MoG
£ 100[%], (92)
\ Market efﬁciency measure IIub =
ˆ CGub
ˆ MoG
£ 100[%], (93)
\ Market efﬁciency measure IIavg =
ˆ CGavg
ˆ MoG
£ 100[%]. (94)
445 Empirical Caveats and Extensions
The quality of the market efﬁciency measures derived and implemented above depends
on how good the data matches the theoretical assumptions of the model. Which as-
sumptions are particularly important and how one can check whether the data admits
to use these assumptions as reasonable approximations is discussed in the following.
First, the theoretical model is based on the assumption that no hidden limit order
(also called iceberg orders) enter the LOB although many LOB markets like Xetra for
example allow limit order traders to submit such orders. Whether the assumption of no
hidden limit orders can be maintained or not depends on how frequently traders make
use of them in the market under investigation. To check for the importance of hidden
limit orders in the sample under investigation, compute summary statistics of order
submissions that reveal the percentage of hidden limit orders. If the fraction of hidden
limit orders in the sample is sufﬁciently small, the assumption of no hidden limit orders
can be maintained. Otherwise HMSS’s base model needs to modiﬁed in order to take
hidden limit orders into account for the derivation of the market efﬁciency measures.
Second, in the theoretical model order quantity is normalized to unity which is rea-
sonable under the assumption that orders fully quit the LOB either as consequence of
execution or due to cancelation. On the contrary, in real world LOB markets like Xetra
partial executions occur. HMSS propose to deal with partial executions by attaching
a partially executed order to the group of fully executed orders if at least 50% of its
quantity is executed and to the group of fully canceled orders otherwise. Again descrip-
tive statistics help to assess whether this procedure can be maintained as a reasonable
approximation of the data from the Xetra trading system: the greater the average per-
centage of the submitted order quantity within the so-arranged group of fully executed
orders and the smaller the average percentage of the submitted order quantity within
the group of fully canceled orders, the better this approximation holds.
Third, the maximum likelihood estimations of the competing risks models for the
latent cancelation and execution times require sufﬁciently large samples in order to en-
sure consistent results. The sample size may in particular be a problem for the subsets
45of marginal buy and sell limit orders which presumably will occur quite infrequently. If
the subsamples of marginal buy or sell limit orders in the Xetra data set happen to be
too small to consistently estimate the execution and cancelation hazard rates, eventually
marginal limit orders need to be combined with orders up to a certain number of ticks
away from the marginal prices.
Fourth, although orders are allowed to last for multiple periods in the theoretical
model, the computation of the estimates of the execution probabilities compare equation
(59) requires the introduction of a censoring time span DT. The censoring implies that
orders lasting longer than DT in the LOB are treated as canceled orders. To identify DT
for the sample under investigation, descriptive statistics revealing the distribution of
the time to execution of orders are useful. HMSS for example set DT to 48,600 seconds
which corresponds to two trading days. They argue that this is a reasonable assumption
since less than 1% of order executions occur later than two trading days after the time
of the order submission in their sample.
Taking these empirical caveats into account should result in market efﬁciency mea-
sures that reﬂect the quality of a real world LOB market like Xetra quite well.
6 Conclusion
MotivatedbytheprominentroleofelectronicLOBmarketsintoday’sstockmarketenvi-
ronment, this paper provides the basis for understanding, reconstructing and adopting
HMSS’s methodology for estimating the gains from trade to the Xetra LOB market at
the FSE in order to evaluate its performance in this respect. Therefore this paper looked
deeply into HMSS’s base model and provided a structured recipe for the planned imple-
mentation with Xetra LOB data. The contribution of this paper lies in the modiﬁcation of
HMSS’s methodology with respect to the particularities of the Xetra trading system that
are not yet considered in HMSS’s base model. The necessary modiﬁcations, as expressed
in terms of empirical caveats, are substantial to derive unbiased market efﬁciency mea-
sures for Xetra in the end.
46Future work should ﬁrst and foremost focus on the realization of the project to es-
timate the gains from trade for the Xetra LOB market alongside the structured recipe
provided above. However, HMSS’s original estimation procedure, which remains un-
touched in this work, and hence also the structured recipe provided above leave a great
marginfor improvementsconcerning the choice of econometric tools. As a consequence,
future work should additionally focus on developing an advanced econometric founda-
tion that will reﬂect real world LOB market characteristics even better. A third interest-
ing direction of future research is to advance the methodology for estimating the gains
from trade to its application not only to LOB markets but to other important market
designs like the hybrid trading system implemented at the New York Stock Exchange.
Such an extension would enable researches to directly compare the most important trad-
ing designs in terms of the gains from trade and to answer the question of whether
particular market designs perform better than others in this respect.
A Appendix
A.1 Competing Risks Model Essentials
Competing risks models provide a method for data analysis when there is a single, pos-
sibly censored failure time FT on each of i = 1,..., I study objects that occurs as conse-
quence of e = 1,...,E distinct causes. The failure type and the failure time are observed
fulﬁlling FT = min(FT1,..., FTE).
A.1.1 Derivation of conditional log-likelihood function of competing risks model
Suppose I study objects indexed by i = 1,..., I give rise to data (ti,di,e,Qcr
i ) for e =
1,...,E possible failure types where ti is the time of the ith failure, di,e is an indica-
tor function for the ith failure type, and Qcr
i is the associated conditioning information.
On the basis of the competing risks model theory provided in Kalbﬂeisch and Pren-
tice (2002), chapter 8, and Lancaster (1990), chapter 5, HMSS show that the conditional
likelihood function of an independent competing risks model with e = 1,...,E distinct
47failure types and independent latent failure times FTe looks as follows
L(.jQcr) =
I
Õ
i=1
(
E
Õ
e=1
he(ti;Qcr
i )di,e exp
Ã
¡
Z ti
0
E
å
e=1
he(s;Qcr
i )ds
!)
. (95)
Taking logarithms delivers the log-likelihood function
logL(.jQcr) =
I
å
i=1
(
E
å
e=1
di,e ln(he(ti;Qcr
i )) ¡
Z ti
0
E
å
e=1
he(s;Qcr
i )ds
)
, (96)
where he(t;Qcr) is the hazard rate for the eth latent failure time FTe
he(t;Qcr) = lim
Dt!0
Pr(FTe 2 [t,t + Dt)jFT ¸ t,Qcr)
Dt
(97)
=
fe(tjQcr)
1¡ Fe(tjQcr)
(98)
with Fe(tjQcr) denoting the distribution of the eth latent failure time and fe(tjQcr) the
associated density. These results are used to compute the log-likelihood functions in the
ﬁrst and the second step estimation in section 4.1.
A.2 Computation of Market Efﬁciency Measures
A.2.1 Current Gains from Trade
The ﬁnal formulas of the estimates of the lower and upper bounds as well as the average
current gains from trade are derived by substituting the parameterization of the private
value distribution from equation (69) evaluated at the parameter estimates
G(ujxt) = ˆ rF
µ
u
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
µ
u
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
(99)
with
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt) = ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G), (100)
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt) = ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G), (101)
48into equations (80) through (82). Consider as illustrative example the estimate of the
lower bound of the current gains from trade:
ˆ CGlb(zt)
= IE
h
I(¡¥ < yt + ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt))(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt)
´³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)(¡ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) · yt + ut < ¥
´
(ut ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0)jzt
i
+IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) · yt + ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt)
´³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)(ut ¡ ˆ ce) ¡ ˆ c0
´
jzt
i
,(102)
which can be rewritten as:
ˆ CGlb(zt)
=
¯
¯
¯¡IE
h
I(¡¥ ¡ yt < ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt)utjzt
i¯
¯
¯ (103)
¡IE
h
I(¡¥ ¡ yt < ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt)jzt
i
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0) (104)
+
¯
¯
¯¡IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
¯
¯
¯ (105)
¡IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
´
jzt
i³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)ˆ ce + ˆ c0
´
(106)
+
¯
¯
¯IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut < ¥ ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i¯
¯
¯ (107)
¡IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut < ¥ ¡ yt
´
jzt
i
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0) (108)
+
¯
¯
¯IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)
¯
¯
¯ (109)
¡IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
´
jzt
i³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)ˆ ce + ˆ c0
´
. (110)
The following transformation rules for the random variable u being distributed as a
mixture of two normal distributions with mean zero and standard deviations ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt),
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt), weighting factor ˆ r, and I(a · u · b) an indicator function that takes the value
491 for a · u · b hold:
IE[I(a · u · b)u]
= ˆ r
µ
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
b
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
a
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
b
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
a
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
, (111)
IE[I(a · u · b)]
= ˆ r
µ
F
µ
b
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
a
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
F
µ
b
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
a
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
. (112)
Applying (111) to (103) delivers
IE
h
I(¡¥ ¡ yt < ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt)utjzt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶!
= ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
. (113)
Applying (112) to (104) delivers
IE
h
I(¡¥ ¡ yt < ut · ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt)jzt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
µ
¡¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
µ
¡¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶!
= ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
. (114)
50Applying (111) to (105) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!
. (115)
Applying (112) to (106) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
´
jzt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!
. (116)
Applying (111) to (107) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut < ¥ ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i
= ˆ r
0
@ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
+(1¡ ˆ r)
0
@ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
= ¡
0
@ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A. (117)
51Applying (112) to (108) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt · ut < ¥ ¡ yt
´
jzt
i
= ˆ r
0
@F
µ
¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
+(1¡ ˆ r)
0
@F
µ
¥ ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
= ˆ r
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A. (118)
Applying (111) to (109) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
´
utjzt
i
= ˆ r
0
@ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
+(1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
¡(1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A. (119)
Applying (112) to (110) delivers
IE
h
I
³
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt · ut · ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
´
jzt
i
= ˆ r
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
+(1¡ ˆ r)
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A. (120)
52Resubstituting (113) through (120) into (103) through (110) delivers the closed form
solution of the estimate of the lower bound of the current gains from trade:
ˆ CGlb(zt)
= ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
+
(
ˆ r
Ã
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!)
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
¡
(
ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!)
³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)ˆ ce + ˆ c0
´
+
0
@ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
¡
0
@ˆ r
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
1
A(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
+
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)
¡
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)ˆ ce + ˆ c0
´
(121)
The closed form solutions for the upper bound ˆ CGub(zt) and the average current
gains from trade ˆ CGavg(zt) are as given in equation (121) with the estimates of the exe-
cution probabilities ˆ y
buy
S(zt)(zt) and ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt) replaced by their appropriate counterparts
53ˆ y
buy
1 (zt) and ˆ ysell
1 (zt) or ˆ y
buy
avg(zt) and ˆ ysell
avg(zt).
Substituting ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt) and ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt) as well as ˆ c
p
e ¢
yt for ˆ ce and ˆ c
p
0 ¢ yt for ˆ c0, equation (121) can be written as
ˆ CGlb(zt)
= ˆ rytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)yt
+
(
ˆ r
Ã
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!)
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
¡
(
ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!)
³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
´
yt
+
0
@ˆ rytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
¡
0
@ˆ r
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
1
A(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)yt
+
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)
¡
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
´
yt (122)
such that the estimate of the lower bound of the current gains from trade as a percentage
54of the common value equals
ˆ CGlb(zt)
yt
= ˆ rˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)
+
(
ˆ r
Ã
ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!)
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
¡
(
ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã ˆ qsell
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ F
Ã
ˆ qsell
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!)
³
ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
´
+
0
@ˆ rˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
¡
0
@ˆ r
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@1¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
1
A(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)
+
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)
¡
8
<
:
ˆ r
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A + (1¡ ˆ r)
0
@F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
0,1 (zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A ¡ F
0
@
ˆ q
buy
marginal(zt) ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
1
A
1
A
9
=
;
³
ˆ y
buy
B(zt)(zt)ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
´
. (123)
Again, the closed form solutions for the upper bound ˆ CGub(zt) and the average cur-
rent gains from trade ˆ CGavg(zt) as a percentage of the common value are as given in
equation (123) with the estimates of the execution probabilities ˆ y
buy
S(zt)(zt) and ˆ ysell
S(zt)(zt)
replacedbytheirappropriatecounterparts ˆ y
buy
1 (zt) and ˆ ysell
1 (zt) or ˆ y
buy
avg(zt) and ˆ ysell
avg(zt).
55A.2.2 Maximum Gains from Trade
The estimate of the maximum gains from trade can be derived by substituting the para-
meterization of the private value distribution evaluated at the parameter estimates into
the formula for the maximum gains from trade
MaG(xt) = IE
2
6
4
Isell¤(ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
+Ibuy¤(ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
xt
3
7
5, (124)
which, written more extensively, looks as follows:
MaG(xt)
= IE
h
Isell¤(ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0) + Ibuy¤(ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)jxt
i
= IE
h
Isell¤(¡¥ < ut · ¡ce ¡ c0;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)jxt
i
+IE
h
Ibuy¤(ce + c0 · ut < ¥;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)jxt
i
=
¯
¯
¯¡IE
h
Isell¤(¡¥ < ut · ¡ce ¡ c0;xt)utjxt
i¯
¯
¯ (125)
¡IE
h
Isell¤(¡¥ < ut · ¡ce ¡ c0;xt)jxt
i
(ce + c0) (126)
+
¯
¯
¯IE
h
Ibuy¤(ce + c0 · ut < ¥;xt)utjxt
i¯
¯
¯ (127)
¡IE
h
Ibuy¤(ce + c0 · ut < ¥;xt)jxt
i
(ce + c0). (128)
Applying (111) to (125) delivers
IE
h
Isell¤(¡¥ < ut · ¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0;xt)utjxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
. (129)
56Applying (112) to (126) delivers
IE
h
Isell¤(¡¥ < ut · ¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0;xt)jxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ˆ rF
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
. (130)
Applying (111) to (127) delivers
IE
h
Ibuy¤(ˆ ce + ˆ c0 · ut < ¥;xt)utjxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ¡
µ
ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
. (131)
Applying (112) to (128) delivers
IE
h
Ibuy¤(ˆ ce + ˆ c0 · ut < ¥;xt)jxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
F
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
F
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ˆ r
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
. (132)
57Substituting (129) to (132) into (125) to (128) and collecting terms delivers
ˆ MaG(xt)
=
¯
¯
¯
¯¡ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¯
¯
¯
¯
+
µ
¡ˆ rF
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
¯
¯
¯
¯¡ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¯
¯
¯
¯
+
µ
¡ˆ r
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶¶
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
= ˆ r2ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)2ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
µ
¡ˆ r2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
= ˆ r
µ
2ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (ˆ ce + ˆ c0)2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
2ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ ce + ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ (ˆ ce + ˆ c0)2F
µ
¡ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
. (133)
In the ﬁrst step the terms from above are substituted and the curved brackets are mul-
tiplied out partially. In the second step the relationships f(u) = f(¡u) and F(¡u) =
1¡ F(u) are applied to collect terms.
Substituting ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt) and ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt) as well as ˆ c
p
e ¢
yt for ˆ ce and ˆ c
p
0 ¢ yt for ˆ c0, equation (133) can be written as
ˆ MaG(xt)
= ˆ r
Ã
2ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ (ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)yt2F
Ã
¡ˆ c
p
e ¡ ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+(1¡ ˆ r)2ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡(1¡ ˆ r)(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)2ytF
Ã
¡ˆ c
p
e ¡ ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
(134)
such that the estimate of the maximum gains as a percentage of the common value
58equals
ˆ MaG(xt)
yt
= ˆ r
Ã
2ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ (ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)2F
Ã
¡ˆ c
p
e ¡ ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
2ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡ (ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)2F
Ã
¡ˆ c
p
e ¡ ˆ c
p
0
ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
(135)
which corresponds to the closed form solution of the maximum gains from trade pro-
vided in the paper of HMSS.
A.2.3 Monopoly Gains from Trade
The estimate of the monopoly gains from trade is obtained by substituting the parame-
terization of the private value distribution evaluated at the parameter estimates from
(99) and the corresponding density function ﬁrst into the monopolist’s optimal quotes
and second via the traders’ optimal order submission strategies from (44) and (45) into
the formula of the monopoly gains from trade from (46).
The estimates of the monopolist’s optimal quotes hence are obtained by solving
ˆ bm¤
t = yt ¡
G(ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
g(ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
= yt ¡
ˆ rF
³ ˆ bm¤
t ¡ˆ ce¡ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
´
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
³ ˆ bm¤
t ¡ˆ ce¡ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
´
ˆ rf
µ
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ˆ ce¡ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)f
µ
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ˆ ce¡ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶, (136)
ˆ am¤
t = yt +
1¡ G(ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
g(ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ ytjxt)
= yt +
1¡
³
ˆ rF
³
ˆ am¤
t +ˆ ce+ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
´
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
³
ˆ am¤
t +ˆ ce+ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
´´
ˆ rf
³
ˆ am¤
t +ˆ ce+ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
´
+ (1¡ ˆ r)f
³
ˆ am¤
t +ˆ ce+ˆ c0¡yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
´ (137)
for ˆ bm¤
t and ˆ am¤
t .
59The monopoly gains from trade
MoG(xt) = IE
2
6
4
Im,sell(bm¤
t ;ut;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
+Im,buy(am¤
t ;ut;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)
xt
3
7
5 (138)
can be rewritten as
MoG(xt)
= IE
h
Im,sell(¡¥ < ut · bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ yt;xt)(¡ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)jxt
i
+IE
h
Im,buy(am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ yt · ut < ¥;xt)(ut ¡ ce ¡ c0)jxt
i
=
¯
¯
¯¡IE
h
Im,sell(¡¥ < ut · bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ yt;xt)utjxt
i¯
¯
¯ (139)
¡IE
h
Im,sell(¡¥ < ut · bm¤
t ¡ ce ¡ c0 ¡ yt;xt)jxt
i
(ce + c0) (140)
+
¯
¯
¯IE
h
Im,buy(am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ yt · ut < ¥;xt)utjxt
i¯
¯
¯ (141)
¡IE
h
Im,buy(am¤
t + ce + c0 ¡ yt · ut < ¥;xt)jxt
i
(ce + c0). (142)
Using the estimates of the monopolist’s optimal quotes and the transformation rules
for the private value distibution evaluated at the parameter estimates from above de-
livers the ingredients for the closed form solution of the monopolist’s gains from trade.
Precisely, applying (111) to (139) delivers
IE
h
Im,sell(¡¥ < ut · ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt;xt)utjxt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶!
= ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+(1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
(143)
60Applying (112) to (140) delivers
IE
h
Im,sell(¡¥ < ut · ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt;xt)jxt
i
= ˆ r
Ã
F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶!
+(1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡ F
µ
¡¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶!
= ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
(144)
Applying (111) to (141) delivers
IE
h
Im,buy(ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt · ut < ¥;xt)utjxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ¡ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡(1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
(145)
Applying (112) to (142) delivers
IE
h
Im,buy(ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt · ut < ¥;xt)jxt
i
= ˆ r
µ
F
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
F
µ
¥
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
= ˆ r
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+(1¡ ˆ r)
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶
(146)
61Substituting (143) through (146) into (139) through (142) delivers the closed form
solution for the estimate of the monopolist’s gains from trade:
ˆ MoG(xt)
=
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¡ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
¡ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
+
¯
¯
¯
¯¡
µ
ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶¯
¯
¯
¯
¡
µ
ˆ r
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶¶
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0).
= ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
!!
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0)
+ˆ rˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡
µ
ˆ r
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt)
¶¶
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
µ
1¡ F
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶¶¶
(ˆ ce + ˆ c0). (147)
Substituting ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
1(yt,xt) and ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G) for ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt) as well as ˆ c
p
e ¢
yt for ˆ ce and ˆ c
p
0 ¢ yt for ˆ c0, equation (147) can be written as
ˆ MoG(xt)
= ˆ rytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)yt
+ˆ rytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡
Ã
ˆ r
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)yt. (148)
62such that the estimate of the monopoly gains from trade as a percentage of the common
value equals
ˆ MoG(xt)
yt
= ˆ rˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
¡
Ã
ˆ rF
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)F
Ã
ˆ bm¤
t ¡ ˆ ce ¡ ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0)
+ˆ rˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)ˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)f
µ
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ˆ s¤
2(yt,xt)
¶
¡
Ã
ˆ r
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s1 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!
+ (1¡ ˆ r)
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
ˆ am¤
t + ˆ ce + ˆ c0 ¡ yt
ytˆ s2 exp(x0
tˆ G)
!!!
(ˆ c
p
e + ˆ c
p
0). (149)
A.3 Prototypical Programming
Table 1 provides an exemplary programming schedule indicating the data and the tools
needed to actually implement the estimation procedure for the Xetra data.
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